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Godzilla Lives! Or, Nonrecourse Careveouts 
Run Amok 
MARSHALL TRACHT 
The author of this article discusses two recent cases which deal 
with unconditional liability on nonrecourse carveouts and spring-
ing guaranties. One potential consequence of these decisions: by 
essentially converting these contingent guaranties to unconditional 
guaranties, the threat of springing liability disappears and the 
guaranties cease to have deterrent effects. If the guarantor is li-
able whether or not the single purpose entity files for bankruptcy, 
why not file? The result is likely to be bankruptcy filings and other 
"misbehavior" by borrowers. Moreover, the analysis used in these 
cases would put many performing loans into default along with 
triggering recourse, threatening substantial harm to borrowers and 
lenders alike. 
T here is a monster stalking American real estate finance, and too many are unaware of the danger they are in. It threatens to do to the commercial real estate industry in the U.S. what Godzilla did 
to real estate in Tokyo. The threat? Unconditional liability on nonrecourse 
carveouts and springing guaranties. 
Marshall Tracht is the Director of the Real Estate LL.M. Program at New York 
Law School. While he was not involved in either of the cases discussed here, he 
is serving as an expert witness in a separate suit addressing these issues. The 
author can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu. 
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THE PLOT OF THE STORY 
Our story begins with any typical securitized nonrecourse mortgage. 
Pursuant to the rating agency standards, a nonrecourse mortgage is accom-
panied by nonrecourse carveouts backed by a guaranty, or by a springing 
guaranty. These provisions are designed to impose liability on the real 
parties behind the single purpose entity ("SPE") borrower if they cause 
the borrower to "misbehave," (that's why these agreements are commonly 
referred to as "bad boy guaranties"). Although precisely what constitutes 
"misbehavior" varies to some extent, these deals all include single pur-
pose entity, bankruptcy remote, and nonconsolidation provisions dictated 
by the rating agencies. 
What they have in common is that neither the guarantors nor the lend-
ers expect these guaranties to be enforced; their job is to ensure that the 
borrower does not contest a foreclosure or file a bankruptcy proceeding if 
it defaults and that the borrower does not get caught up in any bankruptcy 
filed by the developer or investors. They enforce the basic understand-
ing on these nonrecourse mortgage loans: the lender bears the risk of the 
property declining in value below the amount of the mortgage, and it has 
no recourse against assets other than the mortgaged property as long as the 
borrower behaves. 
This idyllic story recently took an ugly tum, however, when two mon-
sters were born in Michigan courts in December, just weeks apart. The 
first is a decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, in 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings, Inc. v. Chester-
field Development Company.l The second is a decision of a Michigan state 
appellate court in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cherryland MalF 
CHESTERFIELD 
The Chesteifield case concerned a $17 million nonrecourse loan se-
cured by the Chesterfield Village Square shopping center. John Damico 
guaranteed the obligations of the borrowerlSPE, and was therefore on the 
hook for any nonrecourse carveouts in the loan documents. 
In 2009, the borrower defaulted. The lender foreclosed then brought 
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suit against Damico for a $12 million deficiency. The lender's claim? That 
one of the nonrecourse carveouts had been triggered by the borrower's 
insolvency. 
"UNAMBIGUOUSL V" WRONG 
There is obvious support for this position, wrong though it is, in the 
language of the agreements. In Chesterfield, the loan documents provid-
ed that the nonrecourse clause would be null and void if, among other 
things, the borrower "fails to comply with any provision of section 4.2 of 
the Security Instrument." Section 4.2(j) states that the borrower shall not 
"become insolvent or fail to pay its debts and liabilities from its assets as 
the same shall become due." Thus, the court found, when the borrower 
became insolvent (the mortgage debt exceeded the value of its assets) and 
when it failed to "pay its debts and liabilities" by defaulting on the mort-
gage loan, the nonrecourse provision was null and void, and the borrower 
and the guarantor were liable for the full mortgage debt. 
The borrower and guarantor raised numerous counterarguments: the 
most telling is that the plaintiff's argument essentially renders the non-
recourse provision meaningless. After all, the only time the nonrecourse 
provision really matters is when property is worth less than the mortgage 
debt and the borrower has defaulted on its payments. A variety of other 
arguments were put forward about the inconsistency of the court's read-
ing with other elements of the nonrecourse carveouts, that the meanings 
of "debt," "liabilities," and "insolvent" are ambiguous when dealing with 
nonrecourse debt,3 and so on. The court found none of these convincing. 
Note, however, that the court was not required at this point to deter-
mine if these arguments were correct, merely whether the carveout provi-
sion was "capable of conflicting interpretations." In granting summary 
judgment, the court not only rejected the defendant's arguments but held 
that these arguments could not prevail no matter what evidence might later 
have been introduced to support them. 
The court, however, at least purported to consider extrinsic evidence 
to see if it disclosed a "latent ambiguity." A latent ambiguity, the court 
explained, 
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arises not upon the words of [the agreement] as looked at in them-
selves, but upon those words when applied to the object or to the sub-
ject which they describe. To verify the existence of a latent ambiguity, 
a court must examine the extrinsic evidence presented and determine 
if in fact that evidence supports an argument that the contract language 
at issue, under the circumstances of its formation, is susceptible to 
more than one interpretation [quotation marks and citations omitted].4 
The defendants offered the mortgage application, the commitment let-
ter, an affidavit from the mortgage broker on the deal, and an affidavit 
from the guarantor to show that the parties did not envision the guaranty 
being triggered by a simple monetary default on the loan or decline in the 
property's value. The mortgage broker, for example, stated 
that there was no personal liability of the borrower (or anyone else) 
in the event of non-payment of the mortgage debt. This also was both 
Morgan Stanley'S and my intention, agreement and understanding and 
also was the intention, agreement and understanding that I conveyed 
to Chesterfield and Mr. Damico. 
The court found that even such express testimony that the provision was 
not intended to act as the court believed it did, did not create an ambiguity: 
[T]he extent of the Defendants' personal liability under the Loan Agree-
ment is not a collateral matter than could give rise to a latent ambiguity; 
rather it is a function of the terms of the contract. As already deter-
mined, those terms unambiguously provide that a failure to make Loan 
payments as required ... nullifies [the nonrecourse provisions]. Extrin-
sic evidence cannot be used to vary unambiguous contract language. 5 
This is circular reasoning at its best: The court will examine extrinsic evi-
dence to determine if there is a latent ambiguity, but because the court 
has already determined that the language is unambiguous, the "extrinsic 
evidence cannot be used to vary" it. 
The court noted the argument that this ruling would have terrible con-
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sequences for the real estate industry, but neither credited the prediction 
nor found that it would affect its analysis of the parties' contract. In the 
end, the court concluded that "[r]egardless of the original, or even essen~ 
tial, purpose of the type of transaction that Defendants wished to enter into 
with Morgan Stanley, they are bound by the terms of the Loan Agreement 
they actually signed." 
This is a key point: even if both parties intended that there be no per~ 
sonalliability in the circumstances at bar, the court held, their actual intent 
cannot control over the "unambiguous" words of the document. 
Of course, ifthe parties intended something other than what was writ~ 
ten, this might seem like cause for reformation of the agreement to reflect 
their actual intentions, but apparently not: 
At most, the evidence Defendants present shows that, though both 
they and Morgan Stanley intended to be bound by the terms of the 
Loan Agreement, both parties misunderstood the legal effect of the 
terms contained in that agreement.... [W]hen parties make "mistakes 
regarding the legal effect of the contract actually made," that contract 
"will seldom, if ever, be relieved against unless there are other equi~ 
table legal features calling for the interposition of the COurt."6 There 
are no equitable considerations in this case that urge the court to re~ 
form the Loan Agreement or otherwise relieve Defendants of their 
obligations under it, as Defendants are sophisticated parties who had 
the benefit of counsel when executing into the Loan Agreement. 
A review of Michigan law on reformation shows that the court is 
wrong on this point. As the Michigan Supreme Court has said, "[i]f read~ 
ing a written instrument (which both parties thereto admit did not express 
their intention) precludes reformation thereof on the ground of mutual 
mistake, then we wipe out hundreds of years of equity and elevate the 
scrivener to the ermine '" [T]he chancellor does indeed concern himself 
with the intent of people. Specifically, ... he will amend an instrument to 
represent the actual agreement of the parties, regardless of the content of 
the parchment."7 
The statement that there must be some "other equitable legal features 
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calling for the interposition of the court" applies where the mistake is only 
as to the "legal effect of the contract actually made," not when the writing 
fails to reflect the "contract actually made" - that is, the actual tenns of 
the agreement to which the parties assented.8 
The mistake here is not about the legal effect of a tenn, but the draft-
ing of a tenn that failed to reflect the actual intent of the parties as to the 
basic economic allocation of risks and rewards in the transaction. Such a 
mistake must be corrected if contract law is to accomplish its basic func-
tion of carrying out the mutual intent of the parties. 
This is in keeping with the view of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, Section 155: 
Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole 
or in part fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both 
parties as to the contents or effect of the writing, the court may at the 
request of a party refonn the writing to express the agreement, except 
to the extent that rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers 
for value will be unfairly affected. 
CHERRY LA NO 
The Cherryland case is similar in important respects. Again, it was 
a suit against a guarantor for the deficiency after foreclosure on a non-
recourse mortgage. The loan documents provided that the loan would 
become fully recourse in the event Cherryland "fails to maintain its status 
as a single purpose entity as required by, and in accordance with the tenns 
and provisions of the Mortgage." 
The mortgage contained a provision with the header "9. Single Pur-
pose Entity/Separateness," raising the question of what provisions in Para-
graph 9 were part of "maintain[ing] its status as a single purpose entity." 
In particular, subparagraph 9(f) contained essentially the same provision 
as in Chesterfield: "Mortgagor is and will remain solvent and Mortgagor 
will pay its debts and liabilities (including, as applicable, shared personnel 
and overhead expenses) from its assets as the same shall become due." 
According to the guarantor, subparagraph 9(f) is an element of the "separ-
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ateness" covenants, and was not needed to maintain the borrower's status 
as an SPE. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the lender, and the 
court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that, regardless of the 
Guaranty's integration clause, which barred the use of extrinsic evidence 
"to contradict, vary, supplement or modify any term," extrinsic evidence 
could be consulted "to define an lllldefined technical term," like "single 
purpose entity." Referring to the Standard & Poor's U.S. CMBS Legal 
and Structured Finance Criteria, the court fOlllld that an SPE "is an entity, 
formed concurrently with or immediately prior to the subject transaction, 
that is lllllikely to become insolvent as a result of its own activities and 
that is adequately insulated from the consequences of any related party's 
insolvency." This shed little light on the issue, of course. Ultimately, and 
without any real analysis of whether there is a difference between SPE 
and separateness covenants, the court held that all of the provisions of 
Paragraph 9 were elements of the borrower maintaining its status as an 
SPE. Again, one can wonder about the conclusion that this contractual 
interpretation is required as a matter of law and that the contract could be 
construed without remand for factual development. 
Regardless, the next question was whether the provision had, in fact, 
been violated. The defendants argued that the insolvency provision was 
intended to prevent the borrower from removing assets, thus becoming 
llllable to pay its debts, and not to deal with a decrease in the value of the 
mortgaged property due to market conditions. The court found, however, 
that the provision was not so limited, and that any failure to remain solvent 
was a violation. Again, the court was not llllaware of the potential impact 
of its decision: 
We recognize that our interpretation seems incongruent with the per-
ceived nature of a nonrecourse debt and are cognizant of the amici's 
arguments and calculations that, if accurate, indicate economic di-
saster for the business commllllity in Michigan if this Court upholds 
the trial court's interpretation. Nevertheless, the documents at issue 
appear to be fairly standardized nationwide, and defendants elected 
to take that risk, as did many other businesses in Michigan and na-
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tionwide. It is not the job of this Court to save litigants from their bad 
bargains or their failure to read and understand the terms of a contract. 
Not every argument the parties made has been parsed here, nor have the 
courts' analyses, in great detail, because anyone familiar with nonrecourse 
real estate lending knows that this simply was not the business deal the par-
ties intended. In fact, the courts in both cases basically admitted as much. 
What are the ramifications of these decisions? 
WHAT NEXT? 
The potential consequences of these decisions are hard to overstate. 
The provisions addressed in these two cases are standard terms that have 
been used in countless securitized and non-securitized loans.9 It is impos-
sible to quantifY the amount ofthese loans, but they are clearly in the many 
tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars. If these decisions survive 
appeal, and courts in at least some other jurisdictions follow suit, the re-
sult will be disastrous for the commercial real estate industry. Among the 
potential effects: 
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A violation of these provisions not only nullifies the nonrecourse provi-
sions in a loan, but is an event of default in and of itself. As a result, 
every SPE with this form of covenant whose property is worth less than 
the outstanding nonrecourse debt is in default, and the lender can ac-
celerate, foreclose and pursue the guarantor( s) unless adequate equity is 
invested into the SPE to cure the default. Given the current state of the 
real estate market, this must be hundreds or thousands ofloans. This risk 
runs not just to the property owner and guarantors, but also to innocent 
tenants whose leases may be extinguished by foreclosure. 
It is possible that even if this equity were injected, a court could hold 
that the terms of the nonrecourse carveouts were violated because the 
borrower had at one point been insolvent, and thus the guarantor(s) 
are on the hook if the loan later defaults. Consider, for example CSFB 
200l-CP-4 Princeton Park Corporate Center, LLC v. SB Rental 1, 
LLC,IO where the springing guaranty was triggered when a borrower 
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took out a junior mortgage without the senior mortgagee's permission. 
Even though the junior mortgage had been paid off and released well 
before the borrower defaulted on the senior mortgage, the court held 
that the guaranty had been triggered and the payment and release of 
the offending junior mortgage did not "untrigger" it. 
Lenders can go back over past foreclosures where everyone as-
sumed the guarantor(s) were off the hook and now file suit against 
the guarantor(s), asserting that the springing guaranty or nonrecourse 
carveouts were violated. While some guarantors might have defenses 
under anti deficiency statutes, statutes of limitations, or arguments of 
waiver, many would not. 
Most guarantors who entered into these types of deals signed far more 
of these contingent guaranties than they could ever repay, understand-
ing that they could avoid their liability by adhering to the mortgage's 
requirements and cooperating with the lender after default. It would 
only take a small number of judgments against such guarantors to 
render them technically insolvent and subject them to judgment liens 
and levies, thereby triggering defaults on their other loan agreements, 
bond indentures, and so forth. Indeed, even without such judgments, 
it is possible that an accountant or auditor would determine that, given 
the state of the law, these guaranties have moved from possible liabili-
ties of indeterminate amount to probable liabilities that are currently 
estimable and that they therefore must be included in the guarantor's 
balance sheet and financial statements. 
• By essentially converting these contingent nonrecourse guaranties to 
unconditional guaranties, the threat of springing liability disappears 
and the guaranties cease to have deterrent effects. After all, if the 
guarantor is liable whether or not the SPE files bankruptcy, why not 
file? The result is likely to be bankruptcy filings and other "misbehav-
ior" by borrowers. 
Lenders lose big. These cases look like a clear win for the lenders, 
but in fact commercial real estate lenders and investors who have pur-
chased CMBS stand to be major losers if these cases are followed in 
any number of states. If even a small percentage of these guaranties 
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are enforced, many controlling parties who signed springing guaran-
ties will find themselves (not just their SPEs) in financial straits. This 
will disrupt their operations, render them unable to make necessary 
investments in their properties, and skew their incentives from long-
term value maximization to milking projects while they can - thus 
endangering the lenders on all of their projects, whether located in a 
jurisdiction that has followed these precedents or not. 
The decisions in these two cases are rendered more serious by several 
factors. First, there do not appear to be any other cases interpreting this 
language, so at this point they are the only precedent on point, which will 
give them added weight in subsequent cases. Second, the opinions, while 
wrong in a number of ways, appear well researched and carefully crafted 
- they are not going to be easily disregarded based on careless reasoning 
or sloppy drafting. Third, they were decided as a matter of law, on sum-
mary judgment. If the courts had decided these agreements were ambigu-
ous and then made factual determinations that the parties had contracted 
for liability on these facts, subsequent courts could follow these decisions 
on the law but come to different factual conclusions based on the specific 
documents and testimony in each case. By deciding that these agreements 
hold the guarantor liable as a matter of law, adherence to these decisions 
would preclude such arguments in subsequent cases. 
All is not lost - yet. Both of these cases are still on appeal, and higher 
courts should recognize the inherent ambiguity (whether patent or latent) 
in these provisions and reject the imposition, as a matter of law, of inter-
pretations inconsistent with the parties' intent on a term of fundamental 
importance to the transaction. Or, if higher courts are truly convinced that 
this is the only viable reading of the documents, there is hope that they will 
be willing to give more serious consideration to reformation of the con-
tracts. Reformation has a high standard in most states, such as clear and 
convincing evidence that the agreement does not reflect the actual intent 
of the parties, and that is as it should be. However, stubborn adherence to 
a reading of the words of a contract that demonstrably violates the basic 
economic terms of the transaction - and the entire industry - is neither 
required nor justifiable. It imposes large and unexpected losses not just 
204 
GODZILLA LIVES! OR, NONRECOURSE CARVE OUTS RUN AMOK 
on the parties, but on others who have dealt with them reasonably and in 
good faith with an understanding of their financial condition, and on the 
economy as a whole. If these decisions are upheld and followed, we will 
all get to watch a horror movie together - one in which the monster wins. 
NOTES 
1 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings, Inc. v. Chesteifield Development Company, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142404 (E.D. Mi. Dec. 12,2011) ("Slip op."). 
2 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cherryland Mall, _ N.W.2d _, 2011 WL 
6785393 (Mich.App. 2011). 
3 With a nonrecourse debt, the obligation of the borrower is limited to the 
lesser of the amount of the debt or the value of the collateral. Thus, it could 
sensibly be argued that if the property drops in value below the debt, the 
liability drops commensurately. In this case, solvency is determined by 
whether the borrower's nonmortgaged assets are adequate to pay nonmortgage 
debts. In fact, this coincides with the intent of bankruptcy remote provisions, 
to reduce or eliminate the possibility of third party creditors who might file 
an involuntary proceeding. This is also in keeping with general accounting 
principles, that a contingent liability is only included in net worth if the loss is 
probable, not just because it is possible. 
~ Slip op. at 26. 
5 Slip op. at 27. 
6 Citing Johnson Family, 761 N.W.2d at 363 (quoting Schmal=riedt v. 
Titsworth, 305 Mich. 109,9 N.W.2d 24,28 (Mich. 1943». 
7 Id. at 372-373 (quoting Urick V. Burge, 350 Mich. 165, 86 N.W. 543 
(1957». (Emphasis in original.) 
8 Id. at 363 (quoting Schmal=riedt v. Titsworth, 305 Mich. 109, 119-120,9 
N.W.2d 24 (Mich. 1943». 
9 This provision can be found in numerous published forms from leading 
practitioners over a substantial period of time. A quick search on one 
computerized database discloses this language in the 2011 edition of a major 
form book, in a sample document in a 2005 PLI coursebook, and in another, 
a 1998 PLI coursebook It is clear that these provisions are common, but 
impossible to tell just how many loans - and how many dollars - are at stake. 
10 410 N.J. Super. 114,980 A.2d 1 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2009). 
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